Aggressive Panhandling

Church and pastor seeking to place temporary signs announcing services filed suit claiming that town's sign ordinance, restricting size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs violated the right to free speech. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Susan R. Bolton, J., denied church's motion for preliminary injunction barring enforcement of ordinance. Church appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judge, 587 F.3d 966, affirmed in part and remanded in part.On remand, the District Court, Bolton, J., 832 F.Supp.2d 1070, granted town summary judgment. Church and pastor appealed. The Court of Appeals, Callahan, Circuit Judge, 707 F.3d 1057, affirmed. Certiorari was granted.

City ordinances intended to restrict aggressive soliciting of funds and prohibit the presence of individuals on traffic medians and islands except for “lawful” purposes were content neutral such that strict scrutiny did not apply in citizens' action alleging that the ordinances violated their freedom of expression protected under the First Amendment; ordinances did not identify or affect speech except by reference to the behavior, time or location of its delivery, restrictions were based on city's legitimate safety concerns, not content of messages, and there was no indication that they were enforced against select groups.

Panhandling ordinance that prohibited solicitation of cash at night and near public transportation vehicle or facility, parked or stopped vehicle, sidewalk cafe or bank did not violate First Amendment; ordinance was narrowly tailored to promote city's legitimate interest in safety and convenience of its citizens on public streets, and ordinance allowed many feasible alternatives to reach both daytime and nighttime downtown crowds.

City's anti-panhandling ordinance, which prohibited oral requests for immediate payment of money, but permitted signs requesting money and oral requests to send money later, was content-neutral, and thus did not violate free speech rights; ordinance did not regulate speech by pitch used, and it was indifferent to requester's stated reason for seeking money, or whether requester stated any reason at all.

Massachusetts statute, making it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place, other than a hospital, where abortions were performed, was not content-based, so as to be subject to strict scrutiny in free speech challenge, based on fact that it established buffer zones only at clinics that performed abortions; statute did not draw content-based distinctions on its face, statute did not require enforcement authorities to examine content of message conveyed in order to determine whether violation occurred, stated purposes of statute including public safety were content neutral, and, because statute was enacted in response to problem occurring only at abortion clinics, limited solution was warranted.

Solicitation ordinance was invalid time, place, and manner regulation, for purpose of analysis under free speech clause of First Amendment, since ordinance was not narrowly tailored to further municipality's substantial interests in protecting local merchant economy, assuring safe and convenient circulation on its streets, and preventing solicitors from harassing pedestrians on public streets and sidewalks; ordinance targeted aggressive pan-handling, solicitation, and handbilling, but it also targeted substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech that was not the source of “evils” it purported to combat.

Freedom of speech and press

Civil action for deprivation of rights

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